What’s happening on the pitch certainly makes sacking Erik ten Hag’s a straightforward decision, but analysing the Dutchman’s time at United involves a series of uncommon but decisive moments that make it a more complicated task compared to what the Reds’ current form suggests. However, after two and a half years, Manchester United have got themselves in the worst possible situation. After renewing ten Hag’s contract in July, they went on to splash out more than 200 million pounds on players of his preference and then gave ten Hag only 13 games before sacking him. It was a project that dragged on inexplicably.
The main reason for that renewal appears to be gradually emerging with increasing clarity: the coaches who were available in the summer to start rebuilding the team did not convince the new board. Which begs the question why they have sacked him now if the choices available are the same as they were in the summer, with the exception of Tuchel.
But then, someone will have to coach Manchester United. Let’s see which are the options reportedly under consideration:
Ruben Amorim – 39 years old – Sporting CP
We will go into detail on the Amorim option because it seems the most likely. As for Amorim, and before going down to business, one thing must be said: he is fixed in his initial approach. He always deploys three man defensive line. This represents a first big difference with ten Hag, who has been varying his formations with little success.
The Portuguese coach, who visited the Mancunian club several years ago at José Mourinho’s invitation, shares similarities with Erik ten Hag in one aspect of the game: their high pressing model. Both want to win the ball back in dangerous situations. In fact, Manchester United averaged more high recoveries (recoveries in the last 40 metres of the pitch) and more recoveries in the opponent’s half per game compared to Sporting’s.
However, they proved to be an inconsistent and patchy team: many high recoveries but little intensity without the ball (meaning the season had times in which the team pressed high and times in which they low block-ed).
On the contrary, Sporting operates like an accordion: they travel together because they recover high and do not get split (55.3% of the defensive actions of the whole team are high, i.e in the last 40 meters) and their PPDA is above average, indicating that they are a fairly intense team that wants to recover the ball quickly in order to have long phases of ball possession. Last season, the Portuguese team averaged 58.6% possession. Under ten Hag, United had the ball 49.9% of the time.
We would say that United use their high-pressing in an attacking way, because they want to recover as high as possible to attack immediately, and Amorim’s Sporting use it to defend, i.e. to prevent the opposition from having possession, because they then want to accumulate a lot of passes.
This is all taking into account that the level of the Portuguese league is considerably lower than the Premier League and that Amorim could change his game plan if he were to arrive at Manchester United. This also applies to the different offensive phases. Although they should be, United are not a dominant team in the Premier League, neither by current status nor by the way they play. You only have to pick a passing map from any given match to compare the two teams: the average positions of the touches of each United player paint a picture of a teams that is usually deep in his own half.
Unlike United, Sporting’s defensive line is high, the wingers gain width and depth into the opponents half and the attackers combine inside and mainly gather on one side to free up the other.
At the beginning of last season ten Hag admitted that he wanted United to be the best counter-attacking team in the world. The idea was clear. As we have already seen, United dropped back and looked to attack the space. As a result, they averaged fewer passes per shot than the Portuguese team (one shot for every 31.7 passes) and the moments they spent in the opposition half were less frequent (47 ball progressions in the final third and 28.3 touches in the opposition box per game).
In these shot maps,which only consider open play situations, without taking into account counter-attacks or individual plays, we can see the striking contrast between the two teams when it comes to creating goal-scoring opportunities from regular play. Unable to create a favourable context for his team against opponents who let him time and space on the ball, Ten Hag relied on counter-attacks and individual actions from his top players: 22.8% of United’s goals in 23/24 came from these two routes. Only 45.6% of them came through regular play.
Amorim seems to be able to coach these situations more successfully: 60.4% of the Portuguese team’s goals came from regular play and only 16.5% came from counter-attacks or individual moves. Sporting’s desire to defend with the ball and to pass without rushing it, although not too calmly either, means that they are capable of creating dangerous situations through collective play.
How Amorim will adapt to a very complex context while being a coach with quite fixed principles around his main idea is the main doubt that the team’s fans should have. What is clear is that he has done wonderfully well in Portugal.
What if it wasn’t Amorim?
Thomas Frank – Brentford – 51 years old
The Dane is one of the options being considered by the English media. He has been mentioned for several of the vacancies that have arisen in the Top 6 teams. Although his Brentford is a solid, counter-attacking team that makes the most of set-pieces, when he had above-average players in the Championship, Frank’s Brentford dominated possession and adopted a very different approach. He is a chameleon-like manager who adjusts very well to his circumstances.
Perhaps he is not the coach that a top team would go for a new project but a middle ground manager to regenerate the squad and club over a number of years. He’s another three-at-the-back lover.
Sebastian Hoeness – Stuttgart – 42 years old
In his first two seasons in the Bundesliga, Hoeness achieved two meritorious mid-table finishes for Hoffenheim. In the first, he finished 11th with an average of 1.26 points per game and in the second, 9th with 1.35 points. In his first full season at Stuttgart, the 23/24, he averaged 2.15 points per game and finished 2nd in the Bundesliga, above Bayern.
The Munich coach excels at making his teams patient on the ball (last year he averaged 5.06 passes per possession, 19.4 passes per long ball and 60.2% possession, figures that are in the top 10% among teams in Europe’s top five leagues).
His defensive numbers should improve if he were to come to United, and it would be high risk, high reward appointment.
Kieran McKenna – Ipswich Town – 38 years old
Connections with Manchester United – he was Mourinho’s assistant, and coach of the Reds’ U18s – make McKenna an easy target, but his performance is a testament to that. He took the reins at historic League One struggling Ipswich Town and in his first full season promoted them to the Championship. The following year, he did the same and now he is coaching the Tractor Boys in the Premier League. In this case, ideally he would have a little more scope to prove himself in the top flight of English football, but United could replicate what Arsenal did with Arteta, who was Guardiola’s assistant and had no experience as a number one, unlike in this case.
