After losing to Nottingham Forest in February this year, David Moyes entered the City Ground press room with one clear, rough argument in his mind: his unwavering defence of a tenure, his tenure, at West Ham that was drawing to a close.
“I think they’ll (the fans) honestly have to say that it’s as good a time as there’s been at the club regarding winning a trophy and league positions. Maybe there’ll be managers who excite them more, possibly, but the one who’s sitting here wins more.”
Under Moyes, and from 2019 onwards, when he began his second spell with the Hammers, West Ham had four top-10 finishes out of a possible six, reached a Europa League semi-final and won a UEFA Conference League against Fiorentina. The Scot would end up managing 230 games, with a total of 103 wins and an average of 1.53 points per game.
Until the fans had had enough of his old fashioned football, unwilling to dominate possession and control the game, David Moyes was one of the few remaining stalwarts of the pre-Guardiola’s Premier League style of play still able to apply that method successfully. Moyes created a West Ham side with no centre-backs who could play from the back (Dawson and Zouma) and a solid, box-crashing midfield with huge aerial power (Rice and Soucek) that could turn every game into a visit to the dentist. He himself accepted this when he said that there could be “coaches who are more enthusiastic”, but that he was not the type to stop doing what he had always done.
So, with the Scot’s project doomed, the board scanned the market for coaches with the modern, progressive style that they believed had a higher ceiling that would allow West Ham to repeat those kinds of heroics and establish themselves as consistent contenders for European places. After several names, they came up with Lopetegui.
This is how he is faring:
1. Style
The change in the way they play is palpable. Lopetegui’s West Ham plays with a single pivot, Guido Rodríguez or Edson Álvarez, and with Soucek and Paquetá further forward, unlike Moyes who started with two holding midfielders in line and an attacking playmaker in front of the pair. His team differs strongly from Moyes’ West Ham in two important moments of play: in possession moments and in defensive transition moments, i.e what happens when the ball is lost.
In the moments just after the loss possession, Lopetegui demands quickly switching on to recover the ball as soon as possible. PPDA is one of the metrics that shows the most noticeable change, going down from 25.1 passes allowed per defensive action to 15.7, which are not remarkable figures compared to the average of the league but do reflect the change in thinking.
If West Ham don’t win the ball back, the motto is clear: stop the opponent from progressing. The contrast is stark in this respect. While West Ham 23/24 were the 5th teams with the least number of fouls committed in the Premier League (10.2), Lopetegui’s West Ham are averaging 15.1 fouls, the 2nd highest figure in the league this year.
2. Defensively
In line with Lopetegui’s aim to defend more aggressively in the early stages of the opposition’s build-up to force turnovers, his West Ham side averages 7.71 high recoveries, those that occur 40 metres or less from the opposition goal. That means that the Basque’s team averages 3 more turnovers than West Ham 23/24 (7.71 vs. 4.61). Consequently, the number of recoveries in the opposition half has also gone up, which is reflected in the percentage increase in the most advanced areas of the opposition half.
Defensive improvements are marginally noticeable, because West Ham still concede the 8th highest number of shots, even though they have managed to decrease the figure from 16.8 to 13.1 from one year to the next. If we look at the image below, which compares the last two seasons under Moyes with the 7 games played under Lopetegui, that drop is narrower, from 14.9 to 13.1. They concede less because they spend more time on the ball, but the quality of shots conceded is still at the same figures (0.11 xG per shot), which is something not great.
It is true that West Ham concede fewer shots, and less xG per game, but the areas from which they concede could be problematic. According to our map of key passes conceded, West Ham have conceded 10 key passes on the left side of their box, close to their goal, that means 17% of the total number of key passes conceded. That figure stands in contrast to the 10% of total key passes conceded from the same area in 23/24. On the right side of the box, the percentage of key passes completed by opponents has dropped from 12% to 7%. West Ham have reduced the opponents outside threat, lowering their number of key passes from 22% to 19%, but opponents are averaging higher shares of passes completed inside the box, which calls into question just how compact and assured West Ham can be when defending their area.
3. Offensively
The attacking phase is what is proving to be the most problematic for Lopetegui. Even if his team has been so far able to establish themselves in the opposition half with ease, to progress the ball into the final third and to get into the box with greater frequency than his predecessor’s teams.
However, in terms of generating tangible threat to the opponents, they have failed to capitalise on their territorial dominance: the quality of their chances is very low. There are only five teams in the Premier League that a lower xG per shot. This could be due to an excess of precipitation. While West Ham are shooting more than on the average of the last two seasons under the Scottish manager, they are one of the teams who shoots the earliest shots (25.9 passes per shot vs. 30.4 passes per shots). That extra pass could be beneficial in increasing the danger of their finishing.
Lopetegui has levelled the creative burden on each side, with Kudus gaining prominence by starting on the left. However another explanation for West Ham’s failure to create real attacking plays is the large number of crosses into the box they are averaging, which could be the result of frustration at not finding the inside routes to generate shots. Although this statistic takes into account all types of crosses into the box, whether from open play or from set pieces, only two teams generate a higher percentage of their danger from crosses: Arsenal and Bournemouth.
Lopetegui fits the profile West Ham were looking for in the summer. His team has the framework of what he wants his team to become: more proactive, less direct… a modern side, so to speak. They protect themselves by having long spells of possession and easily get into the box. However, West Ham have spent 51% of the season losing (Moyes averaged 34% and this year’s Premier League average is on 27.29%), they have shown no obvious improvement defensively and are failing to dominate both boxes.
As for the squad, only two of their eight summer signings are starting (Max Kilman and Aaron Wan-Bissaka). Jean-Clair Todibo started playing frequently just before the international break and his integration seemed close. But in attack, none of Soler, Summerville, Guilherme or Fulkrug have played more than 200 minutes.
There are several reasons for optimism are several: he has a squad with potential at his disposal, with two of the best wingers in the league in Kudus and Bowen, the style has an obvious higher ceiling than the one chosen by Moyes and he already has experience in demanding dugouts (Spanish national team, Real Madrid and Sevilla) and in the league itself, when he managed to save Wolverhampton from relegation.
Any coach in his first two months of work is allowed the benefit of doubt and of course a big amount of time but patience is running thin is football nowadays. Perhaps in a few months we will say that Moyes was right.
Founded in 2017 as a consultancy, Driblab has driven innovation through data in all aspects of professional football. Thanks to a transversal model, its database collects and models statistics in all directions. From converting matches and videos into bespoke data for training academies to developing cutting-edge technology, helping clubs, federations and representative agencies in talent scouting and transfer markets. Driblab’s smart data is used by clubs all over the world, with success stories such as Dinamo Zagreb, Real Betis and Girondins Bordeaux among others. Here you can find out more about how we work and what we offer.
